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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN PENO-
CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATION:
PROGRESSION AND REGRESSION
INTRODUCTION
The term liberty to the average citizen lends itself to a variety of
subjective definitions, but to the prison inmate it can mean just one
thing- freedom from incarceration. Therefore, parole, purely a statu-
tory benefit1 designed to boost the correctional cycle, offers the prisoner
an opportunity to extricate himself from the confines of the prison
walls and rejoin society. Its outward scheme is simplistic, i.e., to pro-
tect the public while taking the calculated risk of conditionally re-
leasing the convict.2 Like parole, good-time credits afford the inmate
an opportunity to gain an early release from prison. They too are
gauged and computed by his behavioral habits while in the confines of
a correctional institution.
However, it should be noted that neither the granting of parole
nor the accrual of good time credits is irrevocable. Therefore the lib-
erty, which the parolee possesses or the prisoner with the number of
good-time days to his credit seeks, may be taken away as a result of a
deviation from the prescribed standard of conduct. Consequently, the
prisoner finds himself again faced with the possibility of serving the
full term of his sentence. How does this come about? What rights of
procedural due process are accorded him in determining the depriva-
tion of his liberty? Moreover, what new developments are there in
collateral areas of law which have given impetus for procedural change
in the peno-correctional area? These are the main questions upon which
this paper will focus its attention.
At the outset, a factor to be taken into account is that procedural
due process is currently an area of much judicial activity. Decisions
1 N.Y. ComREc. LAW art. 8 (McKinney 1968). See, e.g., Cohen, Due Process, Equal
Protection, and State Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42 U. CoLo. L. REv. 197 (1970); Note,
Constitutional Law: Parole Status and the Privilege Concept, 1969 DuYau L.J. 139 [herein-
after Privilege Concept]; Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 GA. L.J. 705(1968); Note, Due Process: The Right to Counsel in Parole Release Hearings, 54 IowA L.
REv. 497 (1968); Note, Rights Versus Results: Quo Vadis Due Process for Parolees, 1
PACIFIC L.J. 321 (1970). [hereinafter Quo Vadis]. See also Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S.
481 (1908).
2 Note, Discretionary Revocation of Probation and Parole: The Import of Mempa v.
Rhay to the Present System, 4 U. SAN FRAN CiSco L. REv. 160, 168 (1969) [hereinafter
Discretionary Revocation].
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interpreting the scope of constitutional guarantees of due process have
not only affected the rights of those in a trial situation, but they have
been concerned with the safeguards of those participating in adminis-
trative proceedings as well. Therefore, it is useful to sort out the strands
of development, i.e., the basis for the original granting or denial of due
process rights, the present status of the law and the rationales therefor.
These developments will then be analyzed in light of their predictive
value, if any, for the future extension or withdrawal of prisoner's rights
by the courts.
THEoRIES UTILIZED TO DENY PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
As previously noted, parole is essentially an early release from a
prison sentence upon meeting and adhering to the various standards
of behavior set down by a parental body known commonly as the parole
board.3 Since it has no basis in common law this mode of reform4 is
strictly a product of statutory creation. This being the case, a number
of rationales have been utilized to reach the conclusion that no rights
of procedural due process accrue to a parolee facing the termination of
his conditional freedom. The ratio decidendi, most commonly espoused
by the courts are the contract theory, parens patriae, the right-privilege
distinction, the theory of protective custody, and the exhaustion of
constitutional rights theory.
The Contract Theory
The contract theory in many instances involves an early release
hinging upon the parolee's promise to accede to any conditions the
state may require to be met. Thus, it is deemed an offer which the
inmate may accept or reject. 5 In other jurisdictions which make it
mandatory for the prisoner to consent, such consent is deemed a
waiver to a later attack on procedural due process grounds.6
3 See Privilege Concept, supra note 1, at 142.
4 Purportedly, the main purpose of parole is to rehabilitate and reduce recidivism.
Several factors are evaluated in considering a prisoner for release. Primarily, his record
is of vital importance but money is also a consideration, i.e., a successful program of parole
can cut down on overcrowding and also pare the cost of feeding and clothing. In addition,
a man may be released to keep his family from becoming a public charge or in hopes
that he may make restitution. Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional
Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 638, 639 (1966) [hereinafter Conditional Liberty].
5 Comment, Parole Revocation Hearings-Pro Justicia or Pro Camera Stellata?, 10
SANTA C L. REv. 319, 331 (1970) [hereinafter Parole Revocation].
6 However, it has been pointed out that such a contract is not one between equals,
as the conditions are imposed rather than meted out between the parties. Thus, if it can
be called a contract at all, it is one of adhesion. Conditional Liberty, supra note 4, at
645-46.
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Parens Patriae
The most current rationale voiced by the courts for the depriva-
tion of due process where a parolee faces revocation is the parens
patriae theory. This was espoused by the now Chief Justice Burger in
Hyser v. Reed7 where it was held that procedural due process was not
a constitutional prerequisite in federal parole revocation hearings. He
maintained that the congressional intent in establishing the parole
board was to facilitate a prisoner's rehabilitation and restoration to
society. This being the case, it was opined that there were no adverse
or conflicting objectives in such a function and that it could not be
likened to a criminal prosecution. 8 The role of the board in revocation
was analogized to that of a parent withdrawing a privilege from a mis-
directed infant and not as a punitive measure for the abuse of that
privilege. 9
The continued authority for this theory is somewhat suspect, how-
ever, in view of its rejection by the Supreme Court in In Re Gault.10
There, the discussion was limited to proceedings which determine
whether a juvenile's delinquency' is due to some purported misbehav-
ior on his part which in turn may cause his commitment to a state institu-
tion . 2 The possible loss of liberty for a period of years was construed
to be of comparable gravity to a penalty for a felony prosecution.' 3
Therefore, it was pointed out that the juvenile needs the aid of counsel
to handle the problems of law, to conduct the inquiry of facts, to insure
regularity, and to determine the possible tactics of defense.' 4 The Court
reasoned that, while due process requirements will make the proceed-
7 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Thompson v. United States Board
of Parole, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
8 Id. at 237.
9 Id. But see Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional
Process, 45 MINN. L. Rv. 803, 814 (1961), where it's felt that the elements of revocation
are very similar to that of a criminal trial. He states that in each instance the question of
fact focuses on the past behavior of the individual, i.e., whether there has been a violation
of the conditions of release or whether the law has been criminally violated.
10387 U.S. 1 (1967).
11 The Court traced the juvenile court movement and explained how it evolved out
of a belief that society was not to decide whether a child was guilty or innocent but to
guide him through his infancy. The underlying theory was that the proceeding was not
adversary in nature, and therefore the courts' role was that of parens patriae. This
rationale was taken from chancery courts which had utilized it to express the state's
power to act in loco parentis for the preservation of the infant and his property interests.
Thus, this idea that a child had a right to custody and not liberty served as a springboard
to the idea that the child suffers no deprivation of his rights. Justice Fortas, speaking for
the majority, said "[t]he constitutional and theoretical basis for this system is-to say the
least-debatable." Id. at 15-17.
12Id. at 13.
13 Id. at 36.
14 Id.
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ings orderly in many instances and in contested cases will bring forth
some facets of the adversary system, it did not follow that the results
would be more harsh.' 5
Consequently, Gault has cast a serious dispersion on the viability
of any use of the parens patriae theory. The rationale behind its appli-
cation to juvenile hearings is substantially the same as that of parole
revocation proceedings.' 6 In both categories the parental authority is
deemed to have a rehabilitative rather than a punitive purpose, and yet
it determines an individual's immediate future on the basis of his past
behavioral conduct. It appears that Gault requires minimal procedural
safeguards for such factual decisions. 7
Extending the due process attitude present in Gault,8 the New
York Court of Appeals pursued its quest of protecting and furthering
the interests of parolees in the case of People ex rel Silpert v. Cohen.19
Any apprehension that juvenile parolees would be treated differently
than adult parolees was allayed in Silpert. There the Court held that
the existing rule, which renders parole revocation hearings and the
concurrent aid of counsel at such hearings a constitutional guarantee
enjoyed by adult parolees,20 was equally applicable to juvenile delin-
quents.
It is interesting to note that the Court mandated the due process
requirements of notice and the presence of counsel 2' despite the exist-
mL Id. at 27.
16 318 F.2d at 225. But, this attitude is to be countered by the poignant expression
favoring due process in People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 385-86, 267
N.E.2d 238, 243-44, 818 N.Y.S.2d 449, 456-57 (1971), where the Court justified the applica-
tion of due process by stating that:
... the parole system is an enlightened effort on the part of society to rehabilitate
convicted criminals. Although few circumstances could better further that purpose
than a belief on the part of such offenders in a fair and objective parole pro-
cedure, hardly anything could more seriously impede progress toward that
important goal than a belief on their part that the law's machinery is arbitrary,
too busy or impervious to the facts. The desired end can become a reality only
by requiring obedience to the demands of due process and granting parolees a
hearing at which they will be represented by counsel.
17Justice Harlan (concurring in part and dissenting in part) commented that one
basic premise of our constitutional government is that an individual, facing deprivation
of liberty or property, is entitled to a proceeding in the tradition of due process. Although
he viewed the state as acting in loco parentis, and did not feel that a juvenile should be
accorded those safeguards available to one in a criminal prosecution, he nevertheless
stated that there is some constitutional obligation to afford due process. 387 U.S. at 65-72.
18 The due process and fundamental fairness requirements promulgated by Gault are:
"1) Notice of the charges; 2) right to counsel; 3) right to confrontation and cross-examina-
tion; 4) privilege against self-incrimination; 5) right to a transcript of the proceedings;
and 6) right to appellate review." Id. at 10.
'9 29 N.Y.2d 12, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1971).
20 See note 108 infra; United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Board of Parole,
- F.2d - (2d Cir. 1971); Goolsby v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
21 In upholding these requirements the Court expressly discarded the contentions that
such safeguards will vitiate the remedial effectiveness between the juvenile and his social
1971]
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ence of section 437 of the New York Social Services Law which actually
authorizes the revocation of parole and the immediate return of ju-
veniles to training schools without the benefit of any type of hearing.
Such a hearing was characterized by the Court as an "accusatory pro-
ceeding" where the determination of liberty or imprisonment for the
parolee is the consequence of a specific review of alleged parolee mis-
conduct. In addition, the presence of counsel was deemed necessary to
ensure a proper presentation of the facts to the reviewing tribunal.22
Right-Privilege Distinction
The right-privilege distinction is most frequently employed to
explain the denial of any procedural rights.2 3 The Supreme Court in
Ughbanks v. Armstrong24 held that parole is not a constitutional right
and is instead a "present" from the state to the prisoner. This appears
to be the foundation for the doctrine espoused in Escoe v. Zerbst,25 the
most often quoted case in support of this theory.2 6 Essentially, the Escoe
rationale was based on the premise that the board is providing the
parolee with parole as a matter of grace and he therefore should neither
expect nor seek due process. 27 However, there is evidence that this doc-
trine is eroding. It was held in Greene v. McElroy28 that although one
may not have a right to a specific thing, once that right is given it
cannot be taken away by any method inconsistent with due process. 29
More recently the Court extended this approach to the area of public
assistance8 0 when it ruled that such aid is a statutory right and not a
privilege.31 These benefits were deemed to be statutory entitlements
whose revocation entailed "state action that adjudicates important
worker, and that the existence of an attorney will act to transfer such a proceeding into
an actual trial which would unnecessarily prolong the revocation proceedings.
22 29 N.Y.2d at 16, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at - (1971).
23 Parole Revocation, supra note 5, at 331.
24 208 U.S. 481 (1908).
25 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
26 There, the Court was not in accord with the petitioner's argument that the privilege
of probation had any constitutional basis other than that provided by statute. It was
opined that since probation was an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, its duration
was subject to Congressional control. Id. at 493.
27 Thus, the prisoner was deemed not to be a citizen with corresponding procedural
rights but was viewed as a felon merely at large at the whim of the state. Id.; Quo Vadis,
supra note 1, at 331.
28 360 US. 474 (1969).
29 In McElroy security clearance had previously been granted to the petitioner, a
private employee, and was then taken away by the Defense Department in a proceeding
that did not afford him the opportunity of cross-examination or confrontation. Conse-
quently, he was discharged and was unable to obtain a similar position elsewhere. Id.
30 Goldberg v. Kelly, 897 U.S. 254 (1970).
31 Id. at 262.
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rights." 32 In addition, the Court reasoned that the identical interests of
government that condone welfare, seek its unimpeded distribution to
eligible recipients as well. 33 Consequently, the recipient was held to be
entitled to obtain an attorney at will.34 Although the Court would not
go as far as to mandate the right to counsel at the hearing, it did state
that the use of such would be beneficial, i.e., "[c]ounsel can help
delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly
manner, conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard the inter-
ests of the recipient."'35
In conjunction with this, it has been ruled that the termination
of a private citizen's tenancy by the government cannot be accom-
plished without first providing adequate procedural safeguards "even
if public housing could be deemed a privilege."36
Constructive Custody
Constructive custody is the view that parole is merely an extension
of the prison walls and since the convict is not free to merely roll the
walls back he has no right to any procedural safeguards.37
However, in California, the constructive custody theory has been
somewhat discarded and replaced by one of "conditional freedom." 38
This places the parolee somewhere in limbo between constructive
custody39 and actual liberty and has been deemed to mean that, but
for the conditions of release the parolee is a free man. 40 Seen in this
light it appears to be as much a fiction as constructive custody.41
32 Id.
33 Id. at 265.
34 Id. at 270.
35Id. at 270-71
36 Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 861 (2d Cir. 1970). Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv.
L. REy. 1439 (1968), makes an interesting point about the fourteenth amendment. In his
claim that the state must observe due process he reflects on the fact that ". . . the amend-
ment does not say that 'no State, except when acting in a proprietary capacity,' shall deny
due process; rather it makes no distinction at all respecting the capacity in which the
state acts." Id. at 1461. Furthermore, he states, that there is no basis for such a distinction
even if the fourteenth amendment were to distinguish between governmental and pro-
prietary action as ". . . it is difficult to see any need to vouchsafe to government the
prerogative of arbitrary power or of fundamental unfairness in its conduct of a public
undertaking." Id.
37 Conditional Liberty, supra note 4, at 646.
38 Parole Revocation, supra note 5, at 332.
39 This theory attains a fictional status as the board maintains that the parolee is in
custody through its parole agent but this "... is not actual custody, and in fact, not custody
at all, ..... " Id.
40 Id.
411d. See also Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932) for an explanation of the
use of the exhaustion of constitutional rights theory in denying counsel at a probation
revocation proceeding. The underlying rationale here is that due process terminates with
1971]
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COLLATERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Probation Revocation
It has already been noted briefly that numerous strides in col-
lateral areas of law have led to the establishment of at least minimal
due process standards.42 The inroads made in these vicinages demon-
strates a definite trend towards the development of procedural safe-
guards where administrative hearings perform a governmental func-
tion. Especially pertinent to developments in parole law are changes
occurring in the related area of probation. Fundamentally, probation
permits the conditional freedom of one convicted of a relatively
innocuous offense as long as he conforms to certain prescribed require-
ments.
43
The case of primary import in this realm is Mempa v. Rhay.44 In
Mempa each petitioner had been placed on probation for a crime
committed. In Mempa's case it was joyriding and in Walkling's (the
other petitioner) it was second degree burglary.45 After surveying the
factual backgrounds the Court concluded that there was a mandate to
provide counsel to assist ". . . in marshalling the facts, introducing
evidence of mitigating circumstances, and in general aiding and
assisting the defendant to present his case . ... "46 In essence, counsel
was seen as a critical element in the proceedings since lack thereof
would lead to the possible loss of certain legal rights.4 7 Apparently, the
Court was moved to this conclusion by the complexity of the proba-
tion situation where the term and imposition of sentence on the prior
guilty plea was grounded upon an offense for which the accused had
never been prosecuted.48
the trial. Thus, the presumption of innocence has disappeared and the interest of society
becomes foremost. The further this theory is advocated the less one must do to be
declared in violation of his conditional liberty. Discretionary Revocation, supra note 1,
at 161.
42 See 397 U.S. 254 (1970); 387 U.S. 1 (1966); 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
43 Discretionary Revocation, supra note 2, at 160.
44389 U.S. 128 (1967).
45 Id. Four months later it was moved that Mempa's probation be taken away on the
grounds that he was involved in a burglary. He went to the hearing without benefit of
counsel nor was any inquiry made in regard to such. At the hearing he admitted an
involvement in the crime. Moreover, the probation officer, without any cross-examination,
was permitted to state that he had information regarding Mempa's participation in the
burglary and that Mempa had previously lied to him.
Walkling, when brought before the court, sought and was granted a one week's recess
to retain counsel. At the later hearing his counsel did not appear, however, and after a
wait of fifteen minutes the court proceeded on with the session. There was no offer of
counsel nor would there have been any if he had requested it. His probation was revoked
on the hearsay evidence of his probation officer. Id. at 130-32.
46 Id. at 135.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 137.
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The Mempa setting presents a close analogy to parole revocation.
But there has been one main weakness in predicting parole develop-
ments from the decision, i.e., its vagueness and uncertainty have led to
diverse reactions. 49 However, Hewett v. State of North Carolina,50 a
recent Fourth Circuit decision, may be indicative of a judicial trend
towards clarification. There, the court pointed out that the probation-
er's liberty hinges upon the decision reached at the revocation hearing
and that substantial rights can be affected51 since the loss of such free-
dom is a possible consequence of the proceeding. 2 Viewing the right-
privilege distinction, the court reasoned that once a state institutes a
probation system for those convicted of a crime it must do so in accord
with constitutional privileges despite the fact that probation is not a
constitutional requirement. 53 Thus, liberty was discerned to be a right
which mandates the protection of counsel.54 The effect that Mempa
and Hewett have upon parole revocation can be seen by taking a
cursory glance at Escoe v. Zerbstr,5 which may be considered substan-
tially modified or even possibly overruled sub silentio by Mempa.50
As previously noted, Escoe prevented the extension of a right to a
hearing for probationers and by analogy was similarly applied to
parolees.57 However, Mempa's grant of representation by counsel at a
probation revocation proceeding means that there first must have been
a right to a hearing before the question of counsel could have been
decided. Thus, it appears that the logic of Escoe is no longer applicable
to a probation or parole revocation situation. 8
49 In the Tenth Circuit the Mempa rationale was not held to apply to parole revoca-
tion hearings. Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968). There the court based
its holding on fact and opined that parole revocation could not be seen in the same light
as probation. But see People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 App. Div. 2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d
600 (4th Dep't 1968).
50415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969).
51 Id. at 1323.
52 Id. at 1322-23.
53 Id.
54 Actually, one fundamental difference between the probationer and the parolee is
that the parolee is subject to the supervision of an administrative agency while the proba-
tioner is generally within the purview of the court. Another distinction is that the parolee's
sentence has already been determined but a violation by either individual may result in
a loss of the same thing -liberty.
55 295 U.S. 490 (1934).
56 See Warren v. Michigan Parole Board, 23 Mich. App. 754, 763, 179 N.V.2d 664, 668
(1970).
57 See note 25 supra, and accompanying text.
58 Query, why are the courts, previously so anxious to analogize Escoe to parole, now
so hesitant to do the same with Mempa?
59 306 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1969).
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Revocation of Good Time
Good-time credits are days which may be subtracted from a
convict's sentence and result in his early release from prison. Their
computation is based on the prisoner's good behavior, while their
revocation can come from any alleged infraction of prison rules.
Significant for the purpose of this discussion are the safeguards ac-
corded a prisoner facing withdrawal of accrued good time.
Decisional results on the federal level have varied from district to
district. Nolan v. Scafati,59 a Massachusetts case, held that a prisoner
has no right to cross-examination, to summon witnesses, or to the
assistance of counsel in a proceeding which could end in the imposition
of solitary confinement and the postponement of his release. The only
constitutional protections available are those "indispensible to fair and
decent treatment, to avoidance of cruel and unusual punishment, and
to preclusion of invidious discrimination." 60 It was viewed that the
convict must be given notice of the charge, informed of the nature of
the evidence, allowed to be heard, and may only be punitively treated
when there is substantial evidence of guilt."'
The Northern District of New York, in holding that similar mini-
mal standards of due process were violated in two cases2 was in accord
with the Massachusetts' view.63 In both districts, discretionary action
by penal personnel would not be subject to judicial scrutiny unless a
substantial impairment of the prisoner's rights could be established.6
Such a hindrance to the prisoner was deemed to exist in Rodriguez v.
McGinnis6 5 where the court explained that the need for security and
swiftness of action cannot permit the disciplinary officer or officer of
the review board to "assume legally the investigative mantle and
become prosecutor, judge and jury,"'0 6 and in the same cases even as-
sume the role of appellate court.67
The Southern District of New York in Sostre v. Rockefeller"6 had
taken a more liberal view than either Massachusetts or the Northern
District. In Sostre the plaintiff was placed in punitive segregation with
the consequent loss of over one years' good time.69 The court reasoned
60 d. at 3.
61 Id.
62 Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Rodriguez v. McGinnis,
307 F. Supp. 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
63 306 F. Supp. at 4.
64 Yd.; 307 F. Supp. at 629.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 632.
67 Id.
68 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
69 Martin Sostre was ordered to punitive segregation by Warden Follette pursuant to
[Vol. 45:468
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that the imposition of this austere punishment required certain pro-
cedural safeguards. It stated that the prisoner was entitled to a precise
written notice of the charges and to have a hearing before an impartial
official with concurrent rights to cross-examine and to call witnesses in
rebuttal. 0 Moreover, a written record of the rationale of the decision
and the evidence upon which it was reached was ordered.71 Lastly, the
court ruled that the plaintiff had a right to be represented by counsel
or by a counsel substitute.7 2
The more recent Southern District decision in Carothers v. Fol-
lette73 appeared to lend tacit approval to the guidelines set down by
Sostre.74 While acknowledging that the flexibility of prison discipline
must be upheld and that there is no obligation upon the state to extend
good time to a prisoner, the court maintained that the arbitrary re-
moval of such credits cannot be permitted.7 5
In essence, the difference between the two views presented above
concerns the prisoner's right to be represented by counsel, to conduct
cross-examination, and to call witnesses in his own behalf. New York's
Southern District supported the application of these rights while its
Northern District and the Massachusetts District did not. This diver-
sity of opinion simply demonstrates judicial conservatism as opposed
to liberality. In Massachusetts an abundance of procedural safeguards
was seen as an unwarranted burden upon the correctional system 70
while the Southern District of New York viewed it as a virtual neces-
§ 140 of the New York Correction Law. On the day of his confinement Sostre was called
in by the warden, who purportedly was distressed over legal papers sent by Sostre to an
attorney. Among these papers was a motion for use in the trial of another prisoner.
Follette claimed he was upset that Sostre was, in effect, practicing law without a license
and wanted assurances that this would not reoccur but Sostre refused.
At the same interview Sostre was asked about R.N.A., an organization he had referred
to in past letters, but his reply to this query was a matter of dispute. The warden re-
garded this organization as subversive and due to a number of other circumstances, feared
that riot and insurrection would take place. Moreover, there was a letter written by Sostre
to his sister claiming that he would either be freed on appeal or by the "Universal Forces
of Liberation." The court found that the plaintiff was not in solitary confinement due to
any major or minor infraction of the rules. It was decided that his punishment was meted
out for legal and Black Muslim activities during a prior incarceration. His advocation of
black militancy was viewed to be an additional factor in prompting the punitive action.
Id. at 867-70.
70 Id. at 872.
71Id.
72 Id.
73 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
74 See id. at 1028-29.
75 Id. at 1028.
76 806 F. Supp. at 4.
77 312 F. Supp. at 872. For a thought-provoking discussion of good-time revocation
see Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795
(1969).
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sity." Nevertheless, both sides were in agreement that a prisoner must
be accorded some procedural protection when facing revocation of good
time. However, on appeal of the Sostre decision the Second Circuit
struck down the procedural safeguards mandated by the lower court.7 8
While acknowledging that Sostre endured severe conditions, the
circuit court refused to require that similar punishments in the future
be limited to a specific length of time.79 Moreover, a plea of limiting
the punitive powers of prison officials led to the view that Sostre's
punishment was not "unconstitutionally disproportionate to the of-
fense." 0
Moving to the question of procedural due process, the court con-
sidered the variety of safeguards present in the analogous areas of
administrative law i.e., termination of welfare payments,8' withdrawal
of residence in public housing,8 2 probation revocation, 83 and parole
release.84 Of those mentioned, the court chose to align itself with the
parole-release decision that it had reached in Menechino v. Oswald.85
There, it was held that one seeking parole was not entitled to formal
trial-type due process because the parole release proceeding is not
adversarial in the same sense that a criminal proscution is adversarial.8 6
This same view was adopted in Sostre, the court feeling that formal
rules of evidence have no application to a disciplinary proceeding87
and that prison authorities must have broad access to pertinent infor-
mation to handle situations within the prison community.8 8 Further-
more, it was felt that the need for legal skills was less acute in good-
time revocation than in a probation revocation situation, for the court
stated that "there is no likelihood that substantial rights would be
sacrificed if a prisoner failed, for example, to raise a proper objection
or to take a timely appeal, . . .. 89 In comparison to the situation where
welfare payment termination is at issue, the evidence in a revocation
proceeding was viewed to be of a more accessible and discernible
78442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
79 The court also noted that segregated confinement is not of itself violative of the
eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 190-92.
80Id. at 194.
81 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
82 Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
83 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
84 Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970). See also Lewis v. Rockefeler, 439
F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1970). Cf. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
85 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970).
86Id. at 412.
87 442 F.2d 178, 196 (2d Cir. 1970).
88 Id.
89 Id.
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nature.9 0 Reaching this conclusion, the court then deduced that there
was also a lesser mandate to cross-examine and call witnesses.01
Leaning on the above logic, the tribunal demonstrated a judicial
reluctance to foist the application of procedural guarantees on peno-
correctional officials. Remedial steps were left to state authorities as
any imposition of due process was deemed to be a matter of conjecture
without the requisite expertise.92
Thus, the appellate body rejected the district judge's finding that
certain procedural elements were constitutional necessities of every
proceeding, resulting in serious disciplinary action to a prison inmate.
It reserved capricious and arbitrary action as the sole criteria for chal-
lenging decisions by prison officials.
PAROLE REVOCATION IN NEw YoRx
Parole in New York is a statutory grant of liberty to the prisoner
contingent upon compliance with the conditions set down by the
parole board 93 The parolee is at liberty until allegation of a violation
has been made. Then he is permitted to appear before the board and
personally explain his actions.9 Whether he will remain on parole or
be returned to prison, lies within the discretion of the board.95
Until recently, the case law in the area of parole board-parolee
confrontation demonstrated that New York courts were satisfied with
the limited rights granted the parolee in revocation proceedings.,,
Parole had been deemed a privilege affording the parolee only
the right to a hearing and personal appearance granted by statute.9 7
90 Id. at 196-97.
91 Id.
92 The court dismissed all analogous arguments presented by petitioner. Id. at 197-99.
93 N.Y. ComRRc. LAw § 215 (McKinney 1960), as amended, L. 1970, c. 475 § 10, eff. Jan.
1, 1971.
94 N.Y. CoRREc. LAw § 218 (McKinney 1968). This section was repealed, L. 1970, c. 476,
§ 44, effective sixty days after May 8, 1970 and can be presently found in § 212. However,
the provision of this section continues to apply in cases where the sentence involved is for
an offense committed prior to September 1, 1967, the effective date of the penal law.
95 Id.
96 People ex rel. Baker v. Follette, 33 App. Div. 2d 1052, 309 N.YS.2d 125 (2d Dep't
1970); People ex rel. Brock v. LaVallee, 33 App. Div. 2d 981, 807 N.Y.S.2d 981 (3d Dep't
1970); People v. Adams, 63 Misc. 2d 52, 310 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Schenectady County Ct. 1970).
97 People ex rel. Ochs v. LaVallee, 33 App. Div. 2d 80, 507 NY.S.2d 982 (3d Dep't
1969). The issue of what procedural rights are available to a resident alien facing possible
exclusion is not unlike the one relating to parole. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590 (1933) involved the denial of hearing on the basis that the information to be used was
confidential. As a result, the petitioner was ordered permanently excluded. The Court
stated that a resident alien's right to remain on American soil may be open to possible
statutory change or other official regulation, but held that he is still entitled to due
process. Moreover, the fact that one cannot be capriciously stripped of his residency status
was not viewed as a danger to national security, because the alien had undergone a thorough
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In addition, it had been viewed that no further rights were neces-
sary since all such hearings are of the post-convictional variety.
9s
Lower courts had also adopted this hands-off approach regarding cor-
rection procedure, 99 feeling that they should not become involved un-
less given the impetus by the legislature or some higher judicial
authority.
For instance, in People v. Adams a convict on parole was held to
be in constructive custody, a status which subjects him to the discipline
of penal authorities while he is not actually incarcerated. 10 In essence,
then, parole has been considered to require supervision consonant with
the purpose of rehabilitation. Consequently, correction officials have
been authorized to exercise a wide range of discretion.''
Until this year the only case of any magnitude in New York which
departed from this trend of thought was People ex rel. Combs v.
LaVallee.10 2 There, as before, the question arose as to whether the
refusal to grant the request to have counsel present at the revocation
hearing was violative of due process. The court compared the parole
situation to probation revocation, which permits representation by
counsel, and concluded that the differences were not so great as to
require counsel in one proceeding and deny it in the other.103 More-
over, parole revocation was noted to be just as much a deprivation of
liberty as an original criminal action and thus required the assistance
of counsel. 04
In spite of its seeming advance towards due process, this decision
was handed down before the statutory change that altered the wording
screening before being admitted to permanent residency. This argument is not overpower-
ing, but it could conceivably be likened to the parole board-parolee relationship; for the
board, too, examines the prisoner before releasing him. Thus, liberty, be it to stay in the
United States or to remain free on parole, is a conditional status which merits at least
minimal safeguards.
98 Cf. id. at 82, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
99 People ex rel Baker v. Follette 33 App. Div. 2d 1052, 309 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1970). The
rationale is that parole is a field of rehabilitation requiring the knowledge of experts.
88 App. Div. 2d at 1053, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
100 63 Misc. 2d at 55, 810 N.Y.S.2d at 11. On a motion to suppress evidence obtained
by the search of the parolee's premises without a warrant, the court noted that a parolee's
rights are not equal to another, who is not under similar disability. Thus, to insure the
power of the authorities the search was not deemed to be unreasonable.
101 Id.
102 29 App. Div. 2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (4th Dep't 1968).
103 29 App. Div. 2d at 181, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 603. The court noted only two appreciable
differences between parole and probation. The first was that in parole the sentence may
not be altered; the second that a parole violation might not be part of a criminal pro-
ceeding.
104 Id. The court also stated that the burden placed upon the parole administration
would not be unduly heavy, as it was amply shouldered when counsel was permitted at
coram nobis and habeas corpus proceedings. 29 App. Div. 2d at 132, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
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of section 218 of the New York Correction Law from an appearance
before a "parole court"105 to a presentation before "three members of
such board of parole."'1 6 Thus, it seems that the court saw the board
in an adversarial light due to the prior language while the alteration
enabled later courts to avoid this approach and not grant any other
rights than those statutorily required 07 However, the recent Court of
Appeals decision in Menechino v. Warden'08 casts this distinction aside.
Menechino was serving a prison term for conviction of second de-
gree murder when released on parole in 1963. The following year he
was declared delinquent and taken into custody. Subsequently, he went
before a parole court for a revocation hearing and although there was
no intimation or conviction of crime, his parole was revoked for a
series of "technical violations." He appeared at that proceeding and
later at three unsuccessful release hearings' 0 -all without benefit of
legal representation.
Chief Judge Fuld, writing for a 4-3 majority, first examined the
correction law as it read at the time of Menechino's conviction and
discerned that it gave "unfettered discretion" to the parole board in
deciding the fate of a parolee facing revocation. 110 Reaching this con-
clusion and finding no clear precedent in the area, he went on to anal-
ogize the parolee's plight to that of a defendant facing revocation of
probation."' While it was acknowledged that probation and parole
were obviously different, it was felt that these dissimilarities should not
militate against legal assistance where the loss of parole may result in
the deprivation of liberty.112 Thus, the breadth of Mempa v. Rhay"3
in the probation areas was viewed to encompass parole revocation as
well, because both situations may be determined on a factual basis."14
Moreover, the majority was in accord with the position that the issue
105 The deletion of the reference to the parole court became effective April 11, 1968.
106 Note 1 supra.
107 An added dimension to parolee's rights in dealing with revocation by state parole
boards can be noted by looking to Warren v. Michigan Parole Board, 23 Mich. App. 754,
179 N.W.2d 664 (1970), which sought to answer the question of whether a state statute
which permits representation by counsel mandates that counsel be supplied to indigents
at state expense. The court held that where there is a factual dispute, the presence of
counsel is of primary import and his lack of attendance impairs fairness. Furthermore, the
refusal to appoint counsel for indigent parolees in such a situation was deemed a denial
of equal protection. But see Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964).
108 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
109 For an account of denial of counsel at parole release hearings see Menechino v.
Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970).
110 27 N.Y.2d at 380, 267 N.E.2d at 240, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
11127 N.Y.2d at 381, 267 N.E.2d at 240, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
112 Id., 267 N.E.2d at 241, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
113 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
114 27 N.Y 2d at 381, 267 N.E.2d at 241, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
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of deprivation of liberty was just as serious then, as it was in the
original action.115 This being so, it was felt that it would be foolhardy
to let the factual outcome hinge upon the parolee's possible inability
to present his case.1 6
The import of Menechino, then, lies in the two new safeguards
it has provided for a parolee facing re-imprisonment. First, he is en-
titled to be assisted by counsel in presenting the factual issues for de-
termination and second, he may call witnesses on his behalf. Thus,
some procedural protection is now there for the parolee's asking.
CONCLUSION
Within the past year the threads of procedural developments in
the peno-correctional area have crossed. While the New York Court of
Appeals has now acknowledged that minimal safeguards are available
to parolees facing revocation, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
severely restricted the procedural protection afforded a prisoner in a
good-time revocation proceeding. Yet a few months ago the converse
was true. The federal district court had required due process in good-
time hearings but parolees in New York were deprived of similar
rights.
Nevertheless, the question at present remains how may these two
developments be reconciled? First of all, it should be noted that neither
parole nor good-time are constitutionally mandated, but in both areas
the courts have said that there is a definite governmental obligation
to ensure against capricious revocation. In regard to parole, the facades
of the right- privilege distinction and the parens patriae theory have
been refuted to the point that officials cannot and should not any longer
hide behind such fictional rationales. Moreover, in New York at least,
the requirement of minimal due process has been judicially determined
to necessitate positive action in the form of procedural safeguards. De-
cisions in the collateral areas of probation, alien exclusion, and public
assistance are in accord with this position.
Still, the court in Sostre did not agree, for the only criteria it laid
'15 27 N.Y.2d at 382, 267 N.E.2d at 241, 818 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
116 Here, for instance, the court noted that counsel could have assisted in a probing
analysis of the parole supervisor's report. Moreover, he could have sifted facts and aided
in preparation for the board hearing. In addition, the court viewed that both the New
York State and United States Constitutions mandated an attorney and the right to intro-
duce testimony if the parolee so chooses- no matter how the proceeding may be char-
acterized. Further, administrative speed and convenience were not deemed to be excuse
enough to disregard these constitutional demands, nor would the majority concur with
the grace and waiver arguments proffered. 27 N.Y.2d at 882-84, 267 N.E.2d at 241-42, 318
N.Y.S.2d at 453-55.
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down were those prohibiting arbitrary and capricious action by state
officials. But good-time revocation, while not totally analogous to
parole, may be close enough in point to also mandate greater proce-
dural protection. Analogous was the methodology employed by the
majority opinion in Menechino, where it likened parole to probation
even though the two areas were not in perfect alignment. However,
Sostre and Menechino are the products of two different judicial sys-
tems- one federal and the other state. Still, the due process issue is
one of constitutional magnitude and therefore these two cases may
be reconciled. Putting aside jurisdictional differences, the major reason
for the diversity of views appears to be the concern over administrative
difficulties. More specifically, the circuit court in Sostre demonstrated
a fear of treading into an area where it was not as knowledgeable as
correctional officials. Moreover, it was feared that the mandating of
counsel would place too heavy a burden on the administrative process.
But the majority in Menechino discounted this argument by seeing an
overriding interest in protecting the parolee. Fundamentally, it all
comes down to the strength and the breadth of the desire to provide
procedural safeguards to an individual confined within the prison
system. While there is probably some merit to the concern that the
addition of counsel and other measures may place a drag on penal
administration, the overriding interest in guarding against the poten-
tial unwarranted loss of liberty mandates the introduction of these
safeguards. Conjecture that administration will be slowed to a crawl
by attorneys seeking to turn proceedings into full-blown adversary
hearings is merely an admission by officials that a high-speed process
has preference over the individual. However, the trend is towards
procedural protection in the so-called privilege area and concomi-
tantly, the individual has priority over administration.
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